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FAMILY LAW-CHILD ABUSE-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINA-
TION-The United States Supreme Court has held that a mother
who is the custodian of a child pursuant to a court order may not
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to
resist an order of the Juvenile Court to produce the child.
Baltimore City Dept. of Social Serv. v Bouknight, 493 US 549, 110
S Ct 900 (1990).
On January 23, 1987, an infant, Maurice M. (hereinafter, "Mau-
rice"), was hospitalized with a broken left leg.1 An examination of
the child2 revealed several healed bone fractures,3 and hospital ob-
servation produced evidence that respondent Bouknight, Maurice's
mother, had been handling him in a manner inconsistent with his
recovery from such injuries.4 Petitioner Baltimore City Depart-
ment of Social Services (hereinafter "BCDSS") was notified by
hospital personnel of suspicions that Maurice was the subject of
child abuse.'
The following month, a court order obtained by BCDSS re-
moved Maurice from his mother's care and placed him in foster
care.' The BCDSS also filed a petition7 in the Juvenile Causes Di-
vision of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, asking that Maurice
be deemed a child in need of assistance (hereinafter "CINA").5 At
1. In re Maurice M., 314 Md 391, 550 A2d 1135, 1136 (1988) (hereinafter, "Maurice
M."). The exact cause of the fracture was not reported; however, child abuse was suspected.
Baltimore City Dept. of Social Serv. v Bouknight, 493 US 549, 110 S Ct 900, 903 (1990)
(hereinafter, "Bouknight"). See notes 2 to 4.
2. Maurice was three months old at the time of this'examination. Maurice M., 550
A2d at 1144.
3. Id. Hospital records made no mention of any type of birth trauma to explain such
injuries. Id.
4. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 903. Maurice's mother was observed dropping him into
his crib despite the fact that he was in a cast due to a fractured left femur. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The petition indicated the following: Maurice's medical history of injuries;
Bouknight's background of emotional problems; Bouknight's childhood status as a child in
need of assistance; a statement that Bouknight had been observed throwing Maurice into a
crib while he was hospitalized; Bouknight's verbal abuse of the physicians and social work-
ers involved; and a statement that Maurice's father had recently been released from incar-
ceration for drug violations. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1136.
8. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 903. Under the provisions of the Maryland Code, a child
that is deemed in need of assistance is a child who requires the assistance of the court
because "[he] is not receiving ordinary and proper care and attention" and "[his parents,
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a hearing on the petition, and upon stipulation to the facts offered
in the petition, an agreement was reached to keep Maurice in fos-
ter care pursuant to a Shelter Care Order issued in February."
Shortly thereafter, however, this order was inexplicably amended,
temporarily returning physical custody of Maurice to Bouknight.10
Subsequently, at a hearing in juvenile court, Maurice was deter-
mined to be a CINA and the State was ordered to resume manag-
ing the care of Maurice.11 As a result, an agreement was reached
between the parties allowing Maurice to remain in Bouknight's
custody, subject to a court order of protective supervision by
BCDSS.
12
Approximately eight months later, BCDSS filed a petition in ju-
venile court seeking removal of Maurice from his mother's control,
representing that Bouknight had violated the terms of the protec-
tive order." BCDSS further motioned to have Bouknight charged
with civil contempt14 for failing to produce Maurice or to reveal his
whereabouts.1 5
guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child
and his problems . Md Cts and Jud Pro Code Ann § 3-801 (e) (1989). Once a child is
deemed in need of assistance, the state has the obligation "[tlo provide for the care, protec-
tion, and wholesome mental and physical development of [such] child." Md Cts and Jud
Pro Code Ann § 3-802(a)(1) (1989).
9. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1136. The State, through BCDSS, obtained an authoriza-
tion to provide shelter, to care for the child and to monitor his care. Id.
10. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 903.
11. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1136.
12. Id. The court order contained extensive conditions to which Bouknight agreed.
The provisions were as follows: Bouknight would cooperate with BCDSS; continue in ther-
apy; attend parental training programs; and refrain from physically disciplining Maurice.
Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 903. These terms were all subject to further court order. Id.
13. Id. The petition related that Bouknight had failed to cooperate with BCDSS and
had refused to inform BCDSS of Maurice's current whereabouts. It further indicated that
Maurice's father had recently been killed in a shooting incident and that since Maurice's
mother had been found to have a history of drug use, adequate care for Maurice could not
be provided by Bouknight. Id.
14. Contempt of court is defined as an act that is calculated to embarass, hinder, or
obstruct the court in the administration of its authority. Civil contempt is a contempt of
court that does not involve a serious affront to the authority of the court. Such contempt is
committed when a person violates a court order requiring him to perform, or refrain from
performing, an act. William Statsky, West's Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary 181 (West Pub-
lishing Co, 1985).
15. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1136-37. BCDSS alleged that on two recent visits by
representatives to Bouknight's home, Bouknight indicated that Maurice was at a relative's
home, but would not discuss the identity or location of such relative. Id. There was evidence
to suggest that BCDSS officials had not seen Maurice for approximately seven months -
since September 4, 1987. Id at 1137, n. 2. The BCDSS further alleged that inquiries estab-
lished that none of Bouknight's relatives had recently seen Maurice. Consequently the po-
lice issued a missing persons report and referred the matter to the homicide division.
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At an April 20, 1988 hearing of the petition, the juvenile court
granted BCDSS's request, citing Bouknight for violating the order
of protective supervision and awarding BCDSS custody of Mau-
rice. 16 A hearing was also held that day on the contempt motion;
neither Maurice nor Bouknight attended.1" In concluding the hear-
ing, the court ordered Bouknight to show cause18 why it should not
hold her in civil contempt for failure to produce the child." There-
after, a bench warrant20 was issued to ensure Bouknight's attend-
ance in court.2 1
In accordance with the bench warrant, Bouknight was subse-
quently arrested, and she appeared before the court on April 27,
1988.22 Upon the court's inquiry into the whereabouts of Maurice,
Bouknight responded in the presence of her attorney that Maurice
was with Bouknight's sister in Dillas, Texas. 23 However, a police
investigation later that day revealed Maurice had not been staying
with his aunt as claimed by Bouknight2" At a hearing the next
day, Bouknight declined to pioduce Maurice and the juvenile court
judge found her in civil contempt 5 for failing to produce Maurice
as ordered.26 The contempt order directed that Bouknight be im-
prisoned until she "purged herself of the contmept by (1) produc-
ing Maurice before the court, or (2) revealing to the court his exact
whereabouts, or (3) by providing 'information' about Maurice to
Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 904.
16. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1137.
17. Id. Although neither Maurice nor Bouknight appeared at the hearing, both were
represented by counsel; Bouknight was cited for failing to appear at the hearing. Bouknight,
110 S Ct at 904. Apparently, Bouknight was afraid that if she appeared at the hearing with
Maurice, the State would "snatch the child." Id. However, BCDSS argued that this was "a
very serious abuse case" and that due to "Maurice's prior history of injuries" the possibility
existed that he was dead. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1137.
18. An order to show cause is a court order to appear as directed and explain why the
court should not take a proposed action. William Statsky, West's Legal Thesaurus/Diction-
ary 694 (West Publishing Co, 1985).
19. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1137.
20. A bench warrant is issued by a court for the attachment or arrest of a person in
order to compel his or her attendance before the court. William Statsky, West's Legal The-
saurus/Dictionary 88 (West Publishing Co, 1985).
21. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 904.
22. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1137.
23. Id. This answer was not given under oath and no objection on Fifth Amendment
grounds was made on behalf of Bouknight. Id.
24. Id. In fact, Bouknight's sister denied seeing Maurice. Id.
25. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1137. See note 14.
26. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1137. There was no evidence that Bouknight was unable
to comply with the production order. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 904.
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the police, or [BCDSS], or the court."27
Rejecting Bouknight's subsequent claim that the contempt order
violated the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion,2" the court stated that the contempt had not been issued be-
cause Bouknight failed to admit or testify as to Maurice's wherea-
bouts, but because she refused to comply with a court order to
produce Maurice or at least reveal his whereabouts.2 9 Bouknight
appealed to the court of special appeals."0 However, prior to the
decision of this intermediate appellate court, the Maryland Court
of Appeals granted certiorari.3 ' The juvenile court's decision up-
holding the contempt order was vacated by the court of appeals
and the case was remanded to juvenile court with directions to re-
lease Bouknight1 2 Upon BCDSS's request, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, acting as Circuit Justice, granted a stay of the court of ap-
peals judgment, pending the timely filing of a petition for
certiorari. 3   The Supreme Court granted certiorari following a
timely petition.
3 4
27. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1137.
28. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person .. shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." US Const, Amend V.
29. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1137-38. The juvenile court rejected Bouknight's claim
on three separate occasions at hearings to strike the contempt order. Id. The court's position
was that compliance with the production order would purge the contempt and require only
that Bouknight perform an act-not testify. Id.
30. Id at 1138. Maryland law established the court of appeals as the highest court in
that state. Md Cts and Jud Pro Code Ann § 1-301 (1989). The court of special appeals is
Maryland's intermediate appellate court. Md Cts and Jud Pro Code Ann § 1-401 (1989). At
the trial court level are Maryland's circuit courts and district courts. Maryland's circuit
courts are the highest common law and equity courts of record, exercising original jurisdic-
tion within the state. Md Cts and Jud Pro Code Ann § 1-501 (1989). The district courts of
Maryland are courts of limited jurisdiction. Md Cts and Jud Pro Code Ann § 1-601 (1989).
31. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1138. While the juvenile court's decision was being ap-
pealed, Bouknight was involved in separate proceedings in which she was convicted of theft
and sentenced to eighteen months in prison. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 904.
32. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1144. The court of appeals concluded that the act of
producing Maurice would be tantamount to an admission that could be self-incriminating in
the event that Maurice was the subject of a criminal act. Id. In producing Maurice or dis-
closing his whereabouts, the court stated, Bouknight was being compelled to communicate
facts in violation of her Fifth Amendment rights. Id. The court of appeals concluded that
the risk of self-incrimination was so substantial that the state's interest in protecting Mau-
rice could not outweigh this privilege. Id at 1143.
33. Baltimore City Dept. of Social Serv. v Bouknight, 488 US 1301, 109 S Ct 571
(1988).
34. Baltimore City Dept. of Social Serv. v Bouknight, 490 US 1003, 109 S Ct 1636
(1989). The grant of certiorari was limited to two questions:
1. Does a court order directing a parent to produce her previously abused infant son
compel incriminating testimony in violation of the parent's Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination?
Recent Decisions
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether a
mother, who is the custodian of a child pursuant to a court order,
may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to resist a subsequent court order to produce the child.3 5 The
majority opinion36 held that the respondent could not invoke a
privilege against self-incrimination to resist an order to produce
her child and that the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals
must be reversed.
37
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor began her analysis by
examining the pertinent language of the Fifth Amendment 38 to the
United States Constitution.3 9 Justice O'Connor emphasized that
the Fifth Amendment privilege clearly "applies only when the ac-
cused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is
incriminating."40  Because the courts below determined that
Bouknight could have complied with the order and purged her
contempt by producing Maurice, the majority examined the judi-
cial command to produce the child in light of the Fifth Amend-
ment." Even though the judicial order demanded that Maurice be
physically produced rather than his whereabouts simply divulged,
the majority determined that the act of production could consti-
tute a protected testimonial communication, i.e., the implicit ad-
mission to the existence, possession, and control of Maurice by
Bouknight.42
2. Even if the Fifth Amendment privilege is implicated by a court order to produce a
child, is the privilege overcome by the important societal interest in protecting chil-
dren in jeopardy of serious injury?
Bouknight, 109 S Ct at 571. The cases were consolidated for argument. Id.
35. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 903.
36. Id. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the majority in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy joined. Id. Justice
Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. Id.
37. Id at 909. The cases were also remanded to the Court of Appeals of Maryland for
"further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion." Id.
38. See note 28 for the specific language of the Fifth Amendment.
39. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 904.
40. Id. Justice O'Connor cited, among other cases, Schmerber v California, 384 US
757 (1966), which stated that "the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled
to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature." Schmerber, 384 US at 761.
41. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 905.
42. Id. However, the majority further indicated that although the act of production
could amount to incriminating testimonial communication, and, as such, may be protected
by the Fifth Amendment, this privilege cannot be claimed with respect to the contents or
nature of the thing produced. Id (quoting Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 408-10
(1976)). Therefore, Bouknight could not successfully assert the privilege against any infor-
mation that an examination of Maurice might produce. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 905.
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However, the majority also recognized that this would not neces-
sarily justify Bouknight's invocation of the privilege to avoid pro-
ducing Maurice.4 3 Even presupposing that Bouknight's production
of Maurice would be sufficiently testimonial and incriminating for
purposes of invoking protection from the Fifth Amendment, the
majority declared that Bouknight could not invoke the privilege in
order to resist producing Maurice, because she had assumed custo-
dial duties over him, knowing that he was the object of non-crimi-
nal governmental regulatory powers. 4
Additionally, the Supreme Court noted, as it had in several
other analagous cases," that when Bouknight reassumed control
over Maurice, pursuant to court ordered limitations, she submitted
to the regulatory system by agreeing to fulfill conditions of a cus-
tody order. 4' Deemed a CINA, Maurice was a legitimate object of
the State's regulatory interests.4 7 The Court concluded that, in as-
suming custody of Maurice, Bouknight accepted the incident obli-
gation to allow inspection by the State, and thereby diminished
her ability to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in the face of
a production order obtained as a product of the State's regulatory
interest in Maurice.4 .
Furthermore, the majority opinion indicated that the privilege
against self-incrimination is available only in criminal cases."
Here, Bouknight was not being singled out for criminal conduct,50
but rather for failing to comply with a production order.51 How-
ever, the majority suggested that even when criminal conduct may
exist, the court may still request production of the child, enforcing
43. Id.
44. Id. Recall that Maurice was under court-ordered supervision, to be monitored by
BCDSS pursuant to an agreement reached by the parties which allowed Maurice to remain
in his mother's custody. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1136. See note 12 and accompanying text.
Upon her failure to honor her custodial duties within the agreement, BCDSS was granted
custody over Maurice. Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1136-37.
45. The Court discussed at least two such cases within its opinion: Shapiro v United
States, 335 US 1 (1948) and California v Byers, 402 US 424 (1971). Bouknight, 110 S Ct at
905, 906. In both cases, the Court applied a balancing test weighing the public's need for
regulation of an object against the custodian's individual claim to constitutional protections
on the other. Shapiro, 335 US at 32 and Byers, 402 US at 427.
46. Bouknight, 110.S Ct at 907. See note 12 for the conditions of the custody order.
47. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 907.
48. Id.
49. Id at 906. In addition to the Court's repeated references to "noncriminal" regula-
tory regime, the language of the Fifth Amendment supports this interpretation. See note 28.
50. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 908.
51. Id at 905.
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such a request through its contempt power.52 In such cases, Justice
O'Connor wrote, it is concern for the child's welfare and safety
that underlies production efforts and not concern for criminal law
enforcement.5"
As a result, the Court determined that Bouknight could not in-
voke her constitutional privilege to resist the order to produce
Maurice." Accordingly, the majority reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 6
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall6 warned that the
chances for self-incrimination were much more significant than the
majority suggested.57 Bouknight apparently could face criminal
abuse and neglect charges, as well as a possible murder charge.58
Arguably, Bouknight's act of producing Maurice would be an ad-
mission of possession and control that would present a "real and
appreciable" threat of self-incrimination.5 9
The dissent further claimed that the Court erroneously relied on
two lines of reasoning not applicable to the present case. First,
the dissent argued that Bouknight was termed a "custodian" of
Maurice when in fact she was his mother.61 A mere finding that a
child is in need of assistance does not divest a mother of legal cus-
tody.62 In short, the dissent pointed out that Bouknight was not
acting as a custodian because she was not acting on behalf of the
State. 3 Instead, she was exercising her parental duties in accor-
52. Id at 908.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id at 909.
56. Id. Justice Marshall was joined by Justice Brennan in his dissent. Justices
O'Connor, White, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, filed the majority opinion.
57. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 909. BCDSS had acknowledged that it suspected Maurice
was dead. See note 15. It further acknowledged that police were investigating the matter as
a possible homicide. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 909.
58. Id.at 909-10.
59. Id at 909. Her production of Maurice could conclusively establish her physical
control over the child and provide a link in the chain of evidence which could establish her
guilt. Id.
60. Id at 910.
61. Id. The dissent cited to Md Cts and Jud Pro Code Ann § 3-801(j) (Supp 1989)
which defines "custodian" as a "person or agency to whom legal custody of a child has been
given by order of the court, other than the child's parent or legal guardian." Bouknight, 110
S Ct at 910.
62. Id at 910-11.
63. Id at 911.
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dance with the court agreement."' Therefore, her ability to invoke
the Fifth Amendment privilege was not diminished because of a
"custodial relationship. '65
. The minority's second contention was that the majority erred in
determining that Bouknight's ability to invoke her Fifth Amend-
ment privilege would be greatly diminished when to do so would
interfere with the operation of civil regulatory powers concerned
with Maurice.6 6 In contrast, the minority suggested that the ability
to invoke this privilege is not similarly curtailed when criminal reg-
ulatory powers are interfered with. 7 Since the "[s]tate's goal of
protecting children from abusive environments through its juvenile
welfare system cannot be separated from the criminal provisions
that serve the same goal," the minority concluded that Bouknight's
Fifth Amendment concerns should not be dismissed as unrelated
to criminal law enforcement. 8 Because Bouknight's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege must be respected to protect her from the serious
risk of self-incrimination, Justice Marshall dissented.6 9
The Fifth Amendment provides in part that "No person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
[herself] .. ,,70 Apparently, it was originally intended-at the
very least-that this Fifth Amendment provision prevent the cus-




67. Id at 912. The minority cites to Marchetti v United States, 390 US 39 (1968) and
Albertson v Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 US 70 (1965) in support of this pro-
position. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 912.
68. Id at 912-13.
69. Id at 914.
70. US Const, Amend V. This guarantee in the Fifth Amendment marked an impor-
tant advancement in the development of liberty-"one of the great landmarks in man's
struggle to make himself civilized." Erwin N. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 7
(Harvard Univ. Press 1955). The Amendment reflected society's unwillingness to subject the
accused to the cruel choice between self-accusation, perjury or contempt, and it reflected
society's fear that self-incriminating statements would be compelled through inhumane
treatment and physical violence. See Murphy v Waterfront Commission of NY Harbor, 378
US 52, 55 (1964).
There are primarily two interrelated aspects of the Fifth Amendment privilege: compul-
sion may not be used by the government to elicit self-incriminating statements, see Coun-
selman v Hitchcock, 142 US 547 (1892), and the government may not allow the use of self-
incriminating statements elicited by compulsion in a criminal trial, see Haynes v Washing-
ton, 373 US 503 (1963).
71. Examples of the brutality used to compel disclosure can be s~en in the occurrence
of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber. See Ullmann v United States, 350 US 422, 428
(1956). By as early as 1628, such practices were pubically abhorred. In that year, Charles I,
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tify against herself.72 The interpretation of this proviso however,
has been extended to protect witnesses, in addition to defendants,
in all methods of interrogation before a court, grand jury, or coro-
ner's inquest, as well as in investigations by an administrative
agency or legislative body. 3 Per se, the Fifth Amendment applies
only in federal proceedings, however, this privilege against self-in-
crimination is granted within the Federal Bill of Rights74 and is
considered so essential to a free society that it is incorporated into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as it ap-
plies to the states." Consequently, the twentieth century has seen
the King of England, requested the advice of his lord chief justice on whether a reluctant
prisoner could be "put on the rack" in order to make him talk. After a consultation with all
the judges, the lord chief justice advised that the law would not permit such a practice.
Proceedings Against John Felton for the Murder of the Duke of Buckingham, 3 How St Tr
367 (1628). In response to public indignation to such violence, other forms of torture to force
a person to talk became popular in this country. The "sweatbox" was a device employed to
accomplish such a task, whereby a prisoner was kept isolated in a small, dark box for days,
until he would "talk the truth" and confess. See Ammons v State, 80 Miss 592, 32 So 9
(1902).
72. John Henry Wigmore, 8 Evidence § 2252 at 324 (Little, Brown and Co. 1961)
(emphasis added). This constitutional provision must not be interpreted in a stingy and
antagonistic spirit. See Ullmann v United States, 350 US 422, 426 (1956). In Ullmann, the
Court noted that many individuals perceive this privilege as a "shelter for wrongdoers,"
assuming that those who invoke the privilege are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in
claiming the privilege. Ullman, 350 US at 426 (citation omitted). As notedfurther by the
Court, this view is hardly flattering to the patriots who sponsored the Bill of Rights as a
condition to the States' ratification of the Federal Constitution. Id at 427. In fact, according
to Chief Judge Magruder, the patriots determined that it would be better for an occasional
crime to go unpunished than for the prosecution to be free to build up a criminal case with
the assistance of forced disclosures by the accused. Maffie v United States, 209 F2d 225, 227
(1st Cir 1954) (citations omitted). Thus, the privilege should be applied liberally to both the
innocent and the guilty. Id.
73. See Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441, 444 (1972) and Wigmore, 8 Evidence §
2252 at 326-28 (cited in note 72) (emphasis added).
74. The first ten amendments to the Constitution, all adopted in 1791, are commonly
called the Bill of Rights. Paul G. Kauper and Francis X. Beytagh, Constitutional Law, 548
(Little, Brown and Co, 5th ed 1980). Their principal purpose is to protect the individual
against various types of interference by the federal government. Id. In Barron v The Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore, 32 US (7 Pet) 243, 8 L Ed 672 (1833), the Supreme Court
decided that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights were not directly binding upon the govern-
ments of the states. The Court concluded that "[hiad the framers of [the Bill of Rights]
intended them to be limitations on the powers of the State governments they would have
• ..expressed that intention ...in plain and intelligible language." Id at 250. However,
after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment (one of three Civil War Amendments),
the new question arose as to whether the provisions of the Bill of Rights were protected
against state abridgment. See note 6. This would remain an unsettled question until well
into the twentieth century. See note 7.
75. The relevant section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
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the application of the privilege to state proceedings.7"
In a series of cases spanning this century, the United States Su-
preme Court has interpreted the scope and application of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. First, in Counselman v Hitchcock,77 the
Court determined that the Fifth Amendment must be interpreted
and applied broadly and may be applied to cases of criminal prose-
cution against the witness himself.78 Stating that the object of the
guarantee is to insure that a witness in any investigation would not
be compelled to elicit testimony which might tend to show that he
had committed a crime, the court noted that although limited to
criminal matters, the privilege "is as broad as the mischief against
which it seeks to guard. '7' Accordingly, a witness in a grand jury
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
76. Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1 (1964). In that case, the defendant was held in con-
tempt of court for refusing to answer certain questions in a state proceeding. Malloy, 378
US at 3. Defendant claimed that under the Fifth Amendment, he was privileged not to
answer because the questions required incriminating responses. Id. The Supreme Court held
that the questions did call for incriminating testimony and reversed, stating that the Fifth
Amendment's exemption from self-incrimination is also protected from abridgment by the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
77. 142 US 547 (1892). Counselman petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus
to release him from custody under a contempt order. Counselman, 142 US at 552. During a
grand jury investigation, Counsleman had refused to answer questions concerning alleged
violations of the Interstate Commerce Act, stating that in so complying he would be com-
pelled to be a witness against himself. Id.
78. Id at 562. This conclusion was consistent with the rule of law established in early
cases. Id at 563-64. See also, Rex v Slaney, 5 Car & P 213 (1832); Cates v Hardacre, 3 Taunt
424 (1811); Maloney v Bartley, 3 Camp 210 (1812); Case of Sir John Friend, 13 How St Tr
767; People v Mather, 4 Wend 229.
The Court in Counselman also considered whether a federal statute, declaring that no
evidence obtained from a witness by means of a judicial proceeding shall be introduced as
evidence or used against him in any criminal court of the.United States, removes the protec-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. Counselman, 142 US at 564. The Court determined that al-
though the statutory provision would protect an individual from the use of his testimony
against him, it would not prevent the use of his own testimony to search out other testimony
to be introduced as evidence against him. Id. Thus, the statute's protection was not co-
extensive with the constitutional privilege. Id at 565. Since the statutory enactment did not
afford absolute immunity against future prosecutions, it did not afford the comprehensive
protection to the witness that the Fifth Amendment was intended to guarantee. Id at 585.
Therefore, the Fifth Amendment's protection was not denied. Id.
79. Id at 562. However, in Holt v United States, 218 US 245 (1910), the Supreme
Court refused to extend the privilege against self-incrimination to exclude evidence ob-
tained from an accused's body. Holt, 218 US at 252-53. In Holt, the question arose in a
murder trial as to whether a blouse belonged to the accused. Id at 252. Testimony was
introduced that a witness observed the accused putting the blouse on and that it fit him. Id.
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criminal investigation, who was not himself the focus of such inves-
tigation, was permitted to invoke his right not to testify against
himself.80
Approximately four years later, in Brown v Walker,81 the Su-
preme Court determined that the objective of the Fifth Amend-
ment was fully accomplished by the grant of statutory immunity
under the Interstate Commerce Act which exempts a witness from
any prosecution on any matter to which he may testify."2 Discuss-
ing Counselman, the Court inferred from its language that, if the
federal statute involved in that case had afforded immunity
against future prosecution, the witness would have been compelled
to testify.83 Applying the language of Counselman, the Court con-
cluded that the grant of statutory immunity included general pro-
tection against future prosecutions and, therefore, would preclude
the invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
8 4
Hale v Henkel5 also echoed the general principle of English and
The accused objected to the introduction of such evidence on Fifth Amendment grounds,
stating that the same compulsion that made his testimony inadmissible, made this evidence
inadmissible. Id. The Court held that the privilege prohibited the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused, but did not prohibit the use of
evidence produced from his body by such compulsion. Id at 252-53. See also, Schmerber v
State of California, 384 US 767 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court held that the privilege is a
bar against compelling communications or testimony from a witness, but that compulsion
which makes the accused the source of physical evidence does not violate the privilege.
Schmerber, 384 US at 764. Thus an accused, charged with an alleged drunk driving viola-
tion, could not assert the privilege to exclude the analysis of his blood level alcohol content
from evidence. Id at 765.
80. Counselman, 142 US at 586.
81. 161 US 591 (1896). Brown declined to answer questions posed during a grand jury
investigation of alleged violations of the Interstate Commerce Act. Brown, 161 US at 592.
Brown was the auditor of a railway company charged with transporting coal at less than the
established rates and offering a coal company rebates to transport the freight. Id. Having
audited the accounts of the freight department during the time in question, he was asked
whether he knew of any such activities. Id. Brown declined to answer on the ground that a
response might intend to incriminate him. Id.
82. Id at 610.
83. Id at 594.
84. Id at 608. The majority reasoned it would be dangerous to extend the principle of
absolute immunity announced in Counselman. Id at 600. Instead, the goal should be "legal
immunity from prosecution" as it is impossible to shield a witness from the personal dis-
grace attaching to the exposure of a crime. Id at 605-06. The Court noted that the fact that
the witness' testimony tended to soil his reputation, but not incriminate him, did not entitle
the witness to invoke the privilege of silence. Id at 606. The Court warned that to hold
otherwise-to assert an absolute immunity test-would encourage the unwarranted invoca-
tion of the privilege for sentimental reasons, for fanciful protection of imaginary dangers,
and for the unlawful purpose of securing immunity to third persons. Id at 600.
85. 201 US 43 (1906). Hale, secretary and treasurer of a company being investigated
by a grand jury for alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, refused to answer the
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 29:819
American jurisprudence that no one shall be compelled to testify
when it may expose him to criminal prosecution." The United
States Supreme Court explained, however, that once the criminal-
ity of the act is removed, 7 the amendment ceases to apply to the
witness' testimony. 8 The Court held therefore, that Hale could not
avail himself of the Fifth Amendment privilege during the grand
jury's oral examination, in light of the fact he had been granted
statutory immunity. 9 Noting that the Fifth Amendment right of a
person to refuse to incriminate himself is an individual right, the
Court further concluded that a witness could not invoke this privi-
lege to protect a third person or a corporation.9
In 1911, the Court in Wilson v United States91 determined that
a corporate representative was protected by the self-incrimination
provision against the compulsory production of his private pa-
pers.2 However, this privilege was not extended to the corporate
books within the representative's possession, even when such docu-
ments would incriminate him personally. 3 To hold otherwise, the
Court reasoned, would defeat public policy.9 ' Indicating that no
Fifth Amendment protection attached to the production of re-
quired records which the officer was obligated to keep, the Court
stated that, in assuming their custody, the officer accepted the in-
grand jury's questions and failed to produce documents requested under a subpoena duces
tecum. Hale, 201 US at 46. Determined to be in contempt of court, Hale was committed to
custody. Id. One of the issues before the Supreme Court involved the immunity of the wit-
ness from the oral examination. Id at 58.
86. Id at 66.
87. Id at 67. According to the Court, the criminality of the act may be taken away by
the running of a statute of limitations, the granting of a pardon or immunity, or by the
outlawing of an offense. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id at 73.
90. Id at 69-70.
91. 221 US 361 (1911). Notably, Wilson involved an officer of a corporation com-
pelled to respond to a production order directed at the corporation by a grand jury. Wilson,
221 US at 386. In a companion case, the Supreme Court determined that the same conclu-
sion would be reached even if the order was directed to the corporate officer himself. Drier v
United States, 221 US 394 (1911).
92. Wilson, 221 US at 377. This is an example of the notion that the Fifth Amend-
ment is a personal privilege. See Hale v Henkel, notes 85 to 90 and accompanying text
(emphasis added).
93. Wilson, 221 US at 384.
94. Id at 383. A corporation is an entity created by the state for the benefit of the
public. Id. Its legal right to operate as such is preserved only as long as it acts within the
law. Id. Thus, the legislature has a reserved right to investigate a corporate entity to deter-
mine whether it has exceeded its powers. Id at 383-84. Therefore, it would be an anamoly to
hold that the State could not demand the production of the corporate books and papers for
such investigative purposes. Id at 384.
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cident obligation to allow inspection. 5 In such cases, a clear dis-
tinction existed between an individual and a corporation, as the
latter had no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and could not refuse to submit its books for an examination by the
State. 6
The Supreme Court in Shapiro v United States9 7 refused to
grant the privilege to an individual's private papers, when the
records sought by a production order were kept as part of a regula-
tory system that required all businesses-incorporated or unincor-
porated-to retain records of specific transactions. 8 Shapiro
stands for the proposition that the privilege as to private papers
cannot be maintained in the face of regulatory requirements which
dictate the keeping of such papers for the appropriate regulatory
aim of providing the government with suitable information.9 In
effect, the reports take on "public aspects"' ° and are available as
evidence against the maker of such records.101
Confirming that the ability to invoke the privilege may be
greatly diminished when invocation would interfere with a general
civil regulatory requirement, the Court in California v Byers'02 ap-
plied a balancing test measuring the public's need versus the indi-
vidual's claim to constitutional protections.0 3 Concluding that the
public's need for reporting was indispensable, that the burden was
on the public at large, and that the statute was essentially regula-
tory and non-criminal, the Byers Court determined that the possi-
bility of self-incrimination was insubstantial.0 4 To this end, the
ability to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege was significantly
95. Id at 382.
96. Id.
97. 335 US 1 (1948). Shapiro was served with an order to produce certain records.
Shapiro, 335 US at 4. Shapiro complied with the order but claimed constitutional immunity
as to any information obtained as a result of the investigation and examination of the
records. Id at 4-5. However, the Court determined that since these records were required by
law to be kept, they were in effect public documents and as a result, no constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination attached. Id at 17-8. Accordingly, since Shapiro could assert
no valid privilege as-to the records required to be kept, he was not entitled to immunity. Id
at 20.
98. Id at 23.
99. Id at 32-3.
100. Id at 34.
101. Id.
102. 402 US 424 (1971). In Byers, the Supreme Court upheld California's statute
which required motorists involved in accidents to remain at the scene and give their names
and addresses. Byers, 402 US at 425.
103. Id at 427.
104. Id at 430-31.
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diminished.' 0 5 However, in Marchetti v United States,06 the Court
decided that regulatory systems that are directed at facilitating
criminal investigations do not result in a similar diminution of the
Fifth Amendment privilege.'0 7 In this case, the Supreme Court re-
versed on Fifth Amendment grounds the defendant's conviction of
conspiracy to evade payment of federal occupational tax on wager-
ing and of failing to register and pay such tax based.'0 8 Since, by
statute, the defendant was required to provide information about
his illegal wagering activities in order to comply with the tax law
and this information was to be made available to law enforcement
authorities for purposes of prosecution, the Court held that the de-
fendant, upon a proper assertion of his privilege, could not be
criminally punished for his failure to comply with these
provisions. 09
In resolving the issue presented by Bouknight, it is imperative to
examine the progression of Fifth Amendment cases decided by the
Supreme Court over the past century. Bouknight contended
throughout the disposition of her case that the court order, which
instructed her to either inform the court about Maurice's wherea-
bouts or to produce him before the court, violated her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination in that she was being
compelled to "verbally or physically produce statements or evi-
dence that may tend" to be incriminating." 0 It was further alleged
that Bouknight's opportunity to purge the contempt order was not
a constitutional one because it might involve admitting to a
crime."' Although both the majority and minority opinions agreed-
that the production order compelled potentially incriminating tes-
timony, the opinions differed as to whether this fact would justify
105. Id at 428.
106. 390 US 39 (1968).
107. Id at 60-1.
108. Id at 61.
109. Id at 61. The Court distinguishes this case from its earlier decision in Shapiro.
See notes 97 to 103 and accompanying text. First, there was no obligation to keep records in
Marchetti (Marchetti must furnish information, not records); second, such information was
not for public inspection; and third, the characteristics of the activities involved were crimi-
nal (rather than non-criminal as in Shapiro). Id at 57. The Court also discussed in
Marchetti whether restrictions upon the use of the information obtained as a consequence
of compliance with the provisions could be used to compel the production of information. Id
at 58-60. However, the Court decided that such an imposition of restrictions in this case
would frustrate a significant purpose in adopting the wagering taxes, as Congress intended
for the information obtained through registration to be provided to prosecuting authorities.
Id at 58-9.




the invocation of the privilege by Bouknight to resist production of
Maurice." 2
Answering this question in the negative, the majority indicated
that since the State had a compelling, non-criminal, regulatory in-
terest in the child's safety and welfare and the mother was a mere
custodian of the child, her ability to invoke the privilege was se-
verely diminished. " s In contrast, the dissent asserted that
Bouknight was not a custodian of Maurice and that Maryland's
regulatory system was closely entwined with the enforcement of its
criminal laws. Thus, the mother should have been able to resist the
production order by raising her Fifth Amendment privilege."'
4
In light of the cases addressing this privilege, the analysis uti-
lized by the Court is not surprising," 5 despite the minority's claim
that the majority's use of precedent was inapposite. First, it must
be determined whether the privilege against self-incrimination is
validly implicated. If this Fifth Amendment provision is impli-
cated, then a balancing test must be applied which weighs the indi-
vidual's need for protection from self-incrimination against the
public's need for regulation." 6 In balancing these interests, it is
apparent that the Fifth Amendment privilege is to be interpreted
and applied broadly" 7 to protect the compelling individual interest
embodied in the constitutional provision." 8 However, in light of
these precedents, it is also apparent that the ability to invoke one's
Fifth Amendment privilege is significantly reduced-if not elimi-
nated-in the following situations: (1) when custodial duties are
assumed;" 9 (2) when production is required as part of a general
noncriminal regulatory system; 20  or (3) when immunity is
112. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 905, 909.
113. See Shapiro, 335 US at 32 and Byers, 402 US at 427.
114. See Md Cts and Jud Pro Code Ann § 3-801(j) (Supp 1989) and Marchetti, 88 S
Ct 697.
115. With respect to production as required by a general civil regulatory system, the
majority follows an analysis similar to that discussed in Byers, 402 US 424. The majority
concluded that Bouknight could not invoke her privilege against self-incrimination to resist
a juvenile court order to produce the child. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 908.
116. Id at 906. This balancing test, which weighs the public's interest against the indi-
vidual's claim to constitutional protection, was utilized in Byers. Byers, 402 US at 427. Re-
call that in Byers, the court determined that the statute requiring motorists involved in
accidents to stop at the scene and disclose their names and addresses was essentially regula-
tory and non-criminal in nature and that the possibility of self-incrimination was therefore
insubstantial. Id at 430-31.
117. See Counselman, 142 US 547.
118. See notes 70 to 71.
119. See Wilson, 221 US 361.
120. See Shapiro, 335 US 1 and Byers, 402 US 424.
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granted.'2 If one of these three situations exist, a claimant's privi-
lege against self-incrimination may be nullified even when bal-
anced against a broad interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.
Applying this framework to Bouknight's case,'2 the Court first
determined that the privilege against self-incrimination was impli-
cated. '23 Accordingly, in balancing the public's need in regulating
the child's safety and welfare versus Bouknight's claim to constitu-
tional protections, the Court determined whether any factors were
present which would diminish her ability to assert the privilege.
The majority concluded in the affirmative that Bouknight assumed
custodial duties over Maurice'" and that, therefore, production
was required in accordance with a general non-criminal regulatory
system, precluding Bouknight from successfully asserting her
privilege.'
2 5
In contrast, the minority decided that none of the three ele-
ments existed which would reduce Bouknight's "privilege invoking
ability." 2 6 The dissenting opinion argued that, by statutory defini-
tion, Bouknight was not a custodian of Maurice.'2 7 The dissent fur-
121. See Brown, 161 US 591 and Hale, 201 US 43.
122. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 905. Recall that the contempt was issued not to force
Bouknight to testify against herself, but because she failed to obey a court order mandating
the production of Maurice. Id. The government was not compelling Bouknight to testify or
produce Maurice in order to build a criminal case. Rather, the apparent objective was to
compel Bouknight's compliance with the custody order regulating Maurice's care. (In fur-
ther support of this proposition it is noted that more than one year has elapsed since the
Court's opinion was rendered and that no criminal case has followed.) But the act of pro-
ducing Maurice might have amounted to incriminating testimonial assertions regarding
Bouknight's control over and possession of the child, thus aiding the State if it decided to
prosecute her. Id at 905.
123. However, the mere possibility of incrimination does not, in all situations, justify
employing the privilege to resist production. Id at 905. See also Byers, 402 US at 428.
124. In accepting the terms of the custody order, Bouknight assumed the incident ob-
ligation to allow routine inspections by the Department of Social Services. She became a
custodian of Maurice. Thus, Bouknight waived her Fifth Amendment protection.
Bouknight, 110 S Ctat 907.
125. Id at 905. To hold otherwise would divest the juvenile court of its ability to pro-
tect any child suspected of being abused. To say that Bouknight has a constitutional right
not to comply with the production order would be dangerous in that it would remove the
essential power of the juvenile court to ensure that Maurice, or any other such child, is safe
through commanding the child's production. Moreover, to apply the constraints of the Fifth
Amendment in cases such as this would be to afford parents "carte blanche to conceal any
negative information about the child's statuts despite explicit court orders to cooperate with
officials." Maurice M., 550 A2d at 1142-43.
126. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 914. In fact, the dissent proposed its own analysis which
would target the particular claim of privilege, the nature of the testimony sought, and the
likelihood of self-incrimination caused by possible compliance. Id at 913.
127. Id at 910. The dissent cited to Md Cts and Jud Pro Code Ann § 3-801(j) (Supp
1989) which defines "custodian" as a "person or agency to whom legal custody of a child has
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ther contended that the ability to invoke the privilege was not cur-
tailed because the invocation of the privilege did not interfere with
general civil regulatory powers, but with criminal regulatory
powers.'
Although the dissent's arguments as to the non-existence of
these factors are compelling, the majority's decision and frame-
work for analysis is more respectful of Fifth Amendment concerns
and societal interests. The Supreme Court was justified in deter-
mining that Bouknight was to be denied her constitutional privi-
lege because the societal interests in protecting Maurice through
the use of compelled production outweighed the minimal risk of
incidental self-incrimination to Bouknight.'2 9
While it is distasteful to allow the government to build a crimi-
nal case with the assistance of compelled disclosure or production
in violation of a constitutional privilege, the mere possibility of in-
crimination does not, in all situtaions, justify employing the privi-
lege to resist production. 10 Undoubtedly, future Fifth Amendment
cases will continue to see a "balancing of interests" test. When all
interests being balanced are significant, the need to invoke the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination may be nul-
been given by order of the court, other than the child's parent or legal guardian."
Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 910 (emphasis added).
128. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 912-13. The minority cited Marchetti, 390 US at 57, in
support of the proposition that interference with criminal regulatory regimes does not result
in the diminution of the privilege against self-incrimination. Bouknight, 110 S Ct at 912.
The minority indicates that "when the conduct at which a civil statute aims-here, child
abuse and neglect-is frequently the same conduct subject to criminal sanction" the civil
statute cannot be characterized as unrelated to criminal law enforcement. Id at 913 (empha-
sis added). Furthermore, the dissent warns that information for criminal convictions is often
obtained from civil proceedings. Id at 912. In fact, Maryland's regulations require the De-
partment of Social Services to maintain a register of abused children and to allow law en-
forcement officials access to it. Id at 912 (citing to 3 Code of Md Regs 07.02.07.08(A)(1) and
07.02.07.08(C)(1)(b)).
129. This is especially so because Bouknight resumed care over Maurice subject to a
court order requiring cooperation with BCDSS. Thus, Bouknight assumed the incidental
obligation to permit routine inspection of Maurice which she failed to allow. See notes 12,
13, and 124. Furthermore, this was a civil case with other aims in view than that of criminal
prosecution. Given that Bouknight is the only living parent of Maurice, she is the only per-
son the State can look to in trying to find the child.
130. Otherwise, to avoid such compulsion, anyone ordered to produce a child by a
juvenile court could introduce criminal ramifications for Fifth Amendment purposes by
spreading a rumor that the child is dead.
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lified by custodial duties, interference with civil regulatory sys-
tems, or a grant of immunity in an attempt to serve the public
interest."'
Molly Elizabeth Puhlman
131. It is with great dismay and disgust that this researcher must report that more
than one year has elapsed since the final decision of Bouknight's case and that Maurice's
whereabouts are still unknown. His mother remains incarcerated on contempt charges for
failing to comply with the court's production order. As of this publication, no criminal
charges have been filed against Bouknight in connection with this case. According to Attor-
ney Mitchell Y. Mirviss of Baltimore, Maryland (Maurice's counsel), "No progress is in
sight."
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